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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State in this case has appealed the district court's order dismissing the 
State's information. The district court granted Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss the 
State's information based on the court's determination that the State had not presented 
sufficient evidence to establish the requisite intent and knowledge elements for the 
charge of video voyeurism. On appeal, the State does not advance any of the 
arguments that were raised before the district court, but instead claims for the first time 
on appeal that the district court erred in not applying an alternate theory of criminal 
liability for video voyeurism than that actually alleged by the State with regard to the 
court's review of whether probable cause existed for the charged offense. 
Mr. McLellan submits that the State has not demonstrated that the district court 
abused its discretion. First, the State presents no legal authority to support its position 
that a court is obligated to seek out any possible theory of criminal liability that has not 
been alleged by the State in rendering its probable cause determination. Rather, the 
language of I.C.R. 5.1 and case law regarding probable cause determinations require 
that probable cause be established for every element of the offense charged by the 
State. Mr. McLellan submits that, in light of this language, the magistrate's probable 
cause determination must be made with regard to the manner in which the offense has 
been charged by the State, and that the reviewing court is not obligated to seek out 
alternative theories of criminal liability than those actually charged by the criminal 
complaint. 
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Second, even if the courts were permitted to seek out alternate theories of 
criminal liability in reviewing whether there exists probable cause for the charged 
offense, the State in this case presented insufficient evidence to support a finding as to 
any intent on the part of Mr. McLellan at the time the images of N.N. 1 were obtained. 
The video at issue was never presented to either the magistrate or the district court, 
there was no evidence as to the surrounding circumstances regarding the obtaining of 
the images contained within this video, and the sole descriptions of the videotaped 
images only established that N.N. removed her clothing in front of the camera. 
Mr. McLellan submits that, under any theory of liability under I.C. § 18-6609, the State's 
evidence was insufficient to establish any of the requisite intents to support the State's 
allegation of video voyeurism. 
Accordingly, Mr. McLellan submits that the State has not demonstrated any 
abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in granting his motion to dismiss the 
State's information based upon the failure to establish probable cause as to every 
element of the charged offense. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State in this case filed a criminal complaint against Mr. McLellan that alleged 
that he had committed the offense of video voyeurism. (R., pp.5-6.) Specifically, the 
Complaint alleged that Mr. McLellan had committed this offense as follows: 
That the Defendant, CHRIS J MCLELLAN, on or between 2/1/10 and the 
1ih day of November, 2010, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did with 
the purpose of sexually degrading and/or abusing another person, to 
wit: [N.N.], did intentionally disseminate, publish or sell any image or 
1 For purposes of this appeal, the alleged victim and her husband are referred to herein 
by initial rather than by first and last name. 
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images of the intimate areas of [N.N.] without the consent of [N.N.] and 
with the knowledge that the sexual images would sexually abuse or 
degrade her. 
(R., p.6.) 
At the preliminary hearing, the State presented the testimony of three witnesses. 
First, the State presented the testimony of N.N.'s husband, T.N., who initially discovered 
the video of N.N. on the internet when he was alerted to it through an acquaintance. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.3, L.8 - p.5, L.16.) T.N. testified that Mr. McLellan and N.N. had two 
children in common, and T.N. and N.N. were in the process of seeking custody of these 
children at the time T.N. discovered the video. (Prelim. Tr., pA, L.5 - p.5, L.10.) After 
T.N. did a search for his wife's name on an internet search engine, he testified that 
there were links to numerous web sites with videos linked to them. (Prelim. Tr., p.5, 
L.21 - p.6, L.?) 
T.N. testified that he investigated these web sites. (Prelim. Tr., p.6, Ls.13-15.) 
Apparently, on some of the web sites there were text posts that referenced both N.N. 
and T.N., and which contained "vulgarities" and references to "the use of drugs" and 
undisclosed sexual matters.2 (Prelim. Tr., p.6, Ls.16-24.) In addition to the text posts, 
T.N. testified that there were three different videos that he saw: two involved depictions 
of N.N. using drugs, and one involved "nudity of her." (Prelim. Tr., p.?, Ls.18-24.) 
Regarding the single video allegedly depicting N.N. while naked, T.N. described 
the video as N.N. "undressing for the camera." (Prelim. Tr., p.?, L.25 - p.8, L.6.) This 
film included "very strange noises" in the background and was edited so that script 
2 Neither the specific content of the text posts, nor direct evidence of these posts 
themselves, were ever provided to the magistrate at the preliminary hearing. (See 
Prelim. Tr., generally.) 
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appeared over the video at the end of the film that stated, "fuck you, cunt." (Prelim. 
Tr., p.B, Ls.2-6.) According to TN.'s testimony, this video displayed N.N.'s breasts, 
genitals, and buttocks. (Prelim. Tr., p.B, Ls.7-13.) 
After viewing this video, TN. contacted an attorney in an attempt to figure out 
how to get the videos taken down or removed from the web sites where they had been 
posted. (Prelim. Tr., p.9, Ls.1-11.) The next day, TN. and N.N. contacted the Ada 
County Sheriff's Office. (Prelim. Tr., p.9, Ls.12-1B.) 
The State next presented the testimony of N.N. She testified that she and 
Mr. McLellan had been in a dating relationship for just over two years, and had two 
children in common. (Prelim. Tr., p.13, Ls.7-24.) N.N. admitted that she had no 
personal recollection of making any videos with Mr. McLellan in which she appeared 
naked. (Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.B-10.) She further testified that she learned that there was 
such a video of her when her husband called her and told her about the web sites. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.11-19.) 
N.N. testified that she examined the web sites where there were videos of her 
posted. (Prelim. Tr., p.14, L.20 - p.15, L.1B.) She discovered videos that depicted her 
naked, although N.N. could not recall whether her breasts were exposed in them. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.15, Ls.19-25.) According to her testimony, there were captions 
associated with this video that used derogatory language towards her - referring to her 
as a crack whore and a lying bitch. (Prelim. Tr., p.16, Ls.1-B.) N.N testified that she 
only made one video in which she was naked on one occasion, but that she never gave 
Mr. McLellan permission to publish this video. (Prelim. Tr., p.16, L.17 - p.17, L.6.) 
Although N.N. described the video of her naked as showing "intimate areas of her body, 
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she did not provide further elaboration as to the contents of the video. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.18, Ls.3-6.) 
The final witness for the State was Detective Charles Lebar, who was involved in 
the investigation of N.N. and T.N.'s report to police. (Prelim. Tr., p.21, L.17 - p.22, 
L.20.) As part of this investigation, the detective interviewed Mr. McLellan. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.23, Ls.3-6.) According to Detective Lebar, Mr. McLellan admitting to having 
posted the video, allegedly because he was upset with N.N. due to the child custody 
dispute they were having. (Prelim. Tr., p.23, Ls.16-25.) Based on this admission, 
Detective Lebar secured a search warrant for Mr. McLellan's computer. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.24, Ls.1-3.) 
The detective testified that Mr. McLellan made further admissions during the 
execution of this warrant. (Prelim. Tr., p.25, Ls.1-9.) Specifically, Mr. McLellan 
allegedly admitted to posting the video to several web sites and stated that he had done 
so because he was upset at N.N. (Prelim. Tr., p.25, L.8 - p.26, L.6.) The detective 
then obtained a video off of Mr. McLellan's computer. (Prelim. Tr., p.25, L.17 - p.26, 
L.9.) 
This video was approximately two and one-half minutes long in total and 
apparently had three segments - only one of which involved any alleged naked 
depictions of N.N. The first portion was merely scrolling text on the screen that included 
N.N.'s name and various derogatory terms. (Prelim. Tr., p.26, Ls.10-24.) The second 
portion, according to the officer, showed a woman who appeared to be N.N. "smoking 
something from aluminum foil." (Prelim. Tr., p.27, Ls.1-4.) After another text segment, 
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the final portion of this video displayed a woman - who also appeared to be N.N. -
undressing in front of the camera. (Prelim. Tr., p.27, Ls.5-10.) 
The officer testified regarding this portion of the video that the woman's entire 
naked body was exposed. (Prelim. Tr., p.27, Ls.11-13.) Detective Lebar also testified 
that the woman in the video looked at the camera several times, so the detective 
believed that this person was aware that the camera was there while removing her 
clothes. (Prelim. Tr., p.29, Ls.1-3.) 
The magistrate, at the close of the State's evidence, was troubled by the 
absence of any evidence regarding Mr. McLellan's intent at the time the video of N.N. 
disrobing was initially obtained. (Prelim. Tr., p.32, L.22 - p.36, L.21.) The State argued 
in response to the magistrate's concerns that the images of N.N. were not "obtained" 
until the images were later edited by Mr. McLellan. (Prelim. Tr., p.33, L.3 - p.34, L.2.) 
Despite the court's expressed misgivings about the absence of proof regarding the 
intent element, the magistrate held that, "the broader approach that's urged by the State 
is probably sufficient for this purpose," and found that there was probable cause for the 
offense as charged by the State. (Prelim. Tr., p.32, L.22 - p.36, L.21; R., pp.24-25.) 
Thereafter, the State filed its Information. (R., pp.26-27.) As with its initial 
criminal complaint, the State's allegation of video voyeurism was limited to the 
allegation that Mr. McLellan had knowledge that the images of N.N.'s intimate areas 
were obtained solely with the intent to "sexually abuse or degrade her." (R., pp.26-27.) 
Mr. McLellan then filed a motion to dismiss the State's Information based upon 
the insufficiency of the State's evidence to establish probable cause for the charged 
offense. (R., pp.47-51.) Specifically, Mr. McLellan asserted that the State's evidence 
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was insufficient to establish that he had the intent to sexually abuse or degrade N.N. at 
the time that he initially obtained the images of her intimate areas. (R., pp.50-51.) 
The State objected to this motion. (R., pp.60-63.) In its objection to this motion, 
the State expressly acknowledged that the sole intent upon which its charge was 
predicated with regard to the obtaining of the images was, "the purpose of sexually 
degrading or abusing any other person." (R., p.61.) However, the State reiterated its 
position that Mr. McLellan did not obtain the images of N.N.'s intimate areas until after 
he had made edits to those images by adding additional text to them. (R., pp.60-63.) 
The district court granted Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss. (Tr., pA, LA - p.6, 
L.16; R., pp.66-70.) In its written order granting this motion, the district court specifically 
noted that the State's sole allegation regarding the knowledge and intent requirement 
for its allegation of video voyeurism was that Mr. McLellan had "the purpose of sexually 
degrading or abusing" N.N. (R., p.68.) The court also found that this intent must have 
existed at the time the images were obtained. (R., p.69.) 
As a factual finding, the district court determined that the images of N.N.'s 
intimate areas were obtained during the course of Mr. McLellan's relationship with N.N. 
between 2004 and 2007. (R., p.69.) The court implicitly found that there was no 
evidence that Mr. McLellan harbored the purpose of sexually abusing or degrading N.N. 
at the time the video was made during the course of their prior relationship. (R., pp.69-
70.) Accordingly, the court granted Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss the State's 
information. (R., p.70.) 
The State timely appealed from the district court's order granting Mr. McLellan's 
motion to dismiss. (R., p.71.) 
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ISSUE 
Has the State failed to establish that the district court erred when it granted 
Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss the State's information due to a lack of probable cause 
to support the offense charged? 
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ARGUMENT 
The State Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred When It Granted 
Mr. McLellan's Motion To Dismiss The State's Information Due To A Lack Of Probable 
Cause To Support The Offense Charged 
A. Introduction 
Mr. McLellan asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate that the district 
court abused its discretion in granting his motion to dismiss the State's information 
based upon the failure of the State to establish probable cause for every element of the 
charged offense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard upon review of a district 
court's determination regarding a motion to dismiss. State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184-
185 (2002); State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, _ Idaho _, 275 P.3d 1, 4 (2012). "When a 
district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the Court determines 
whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) reached its decision through the 
exercise of reason." Martinez-Gonzalez, 275 P.3d at 4. When reviewing a finding of 
probable cause, this Court defers to the findings of fact of the lower court that are 
supported by substantial evidence, but this Court reviews de novo whether those facts 
as found constitute probable cause. Id. 
In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de 
novo. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176,177 (Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, this Court is 
obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a 
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construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid 
treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v. 
Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177; State v. 
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. McLellan's Motion To Dismiss The 
State's Information Due To A Lack Of Probable Cause 
1. The Determination Of Whether There Exists Probable Cause To Support 
The State's Charged Offense Is Limited To The Actual Charge Alleged By 
The State In Its Complaint, And There Was Insufficient Evidence To 
Support A Finding Of Probable Cause For The Offense Of Video 
Voyeurism As Alleged By The State In This Case 
In this case, the State in both its initial criminal complaint and its Information 
charged Mr. McLellan with video voyeurism pursuant to I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b). (R., pp.5-
6, 26-27.) The entirety of this statutory provision provides that: 
(2) A person is guilty of video voyeurism when, with the intent of 
arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions of such 
person or another person, or for his own or another person's 
lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest, or for the 
purpose of sexually degrading or abusing any other person: 
(b) He intentionally disseminates, publishes or sells any image or 
images of the intimate areas of another person or persons without 
the consent of such other person or persons and with the 
knowledge that such image or images were obtained with the 
intent set forth above. 
I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
Under the plain language of the statute, the State was required in this case to 
establish both that Mr. McLellan had the requisite intent at the time of allegedly 
disseminating or publishing images of the intimate areas of N.N., and that he had 
knowledge that the images of N.N. were initially obtained with that intent as well. 
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There are three alternate intents set forth by statute: (1) the intent of arousing, 
appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions of the defendant or another person; (2) the 
intent of satisfying his own or another person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction 
of prurient interest; and (3) the intent of sexually degrading or abusing another person. 
I.C. § 18-6609(2). While there are three alternate intents that may sustain a charge of 
video voyeurism, the State in this case only alleged one of these intents in both its 
criminal complaint and the subsequent Information: that Mr. McLellan had the intent to 
sexually abuse and degrade N.N. both at the time of publishing or disseminating the 
images of her and at the time of obtaining these images. (R., pp.5-6, 26-27.) 
The State's entire argument as to why this Court should overturn the district 
court's determination that the State did not establish probable cause as to the offense 
as charged by the State is reliant upon one central premise - that the district court 
should have ignored the manner in which the State alleged Mr. McLellan had committed 
video voyeurism within its complaint, and that the district court should have instead 
sought out an alternate theory upon which the State's charge could have been 
sustained within the governing statute. The State argues solely that the magistrate's 
probable cause determination should have been upheld based on a finding of an intent 
other than that alleged by the State, i.e., the intent of "arousing, appealing to or 
gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of [himself] or another person, or for his 
own or another person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.1 0.) 
While the State is correct insofar as these are two of the three intents that may 
support a charge of video voyeurism, the State never alleged either of these two intents 
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in support of its charge in the criminal complaint or information in this case. (R., pp.5-6, 
24-27.) Despite the fact that the prosecutor had elected to proceed solely on the 
allegation that Mr. McLellan had the intent of sexually degrading or abusing N.N. at the 
time he obtained the images of her intimate parts, the State is now seeking on appeal to 
have this Court look beyond the State's own allegations in order to find probable cause. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.12 ("The district court erred by requiring the State to establish 
probable cause to believe that McLellan knew the images of [N.N.] were obtained with 
only the intent to sexually degrade or sexually abuse her.").) 
In the section of the argument where the State advances this claim, the State 
notably cites to no authority at all to support this proposition. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-
12.) Because the State as the Appellant in this case has failed to support its arguments 
on appeal with any legal authority, this Court should decline to entertain the merits of 
the State's assertion that the district court was required to seek out an alternate legal 
theory, other than that presented in the State's criminal complaint, in order to find 
probable cause for the State's charge. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). 
In addition, this claim is markedly different than that presented to the district 
court. The State's argument before the district court was limited to the claim that the 
images of N.N.'s intimate areas were not obtained until Mr. McLellan edited these 
images to include text, and that he had the intent to sexually abuse or degrade her at 
that time. (R., pp.60-63.) The State makes no contention in this appeal that the images 
of N.N.'s intimate areas were obtained when Mr. McLellan made edits to those images, 
or that Mr. McLellan had the intent to sexually abuse or degrade N.N. at the time the 
12 
images were obtained - and rightly SO.3 (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-12.) In fact, it would 
appear to be logically impossible for these images to have been edited or altered by 
Mr. McLellan prior to them actually being obtained by him. 
"The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are 
presented for the first time on appeal." State v. Gertsch, 137 Idaho 387, 395 (2002) 
(quoting State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 529 (1993)). Because the State, as the 
Appellant in this case, failed to raise the claims now relied upon in this appeal to the trial 
court with regard to Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss, Mr. McLellan asserts that the 
State has not preserved its claims for this Court's review. 
However, even if this Court is inclined to entertain the merits of this claim, the 
State's argument appears to be contrary to the legal standards attendant on a district 
court's review for whether the State has established probable cause for the charged 
offense. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 governs preliminary hearings, and requires in 
pertinent part that a magistrates finding of probable cause, "shall be based upon 
substantial evidence upon every material element of the offense charged." I.C.R. 
5.1 (b) (emphasis added). Therefore, under the plain terms of this rule, the measure of 
whether probable cause has been established is based upon the offense as it has been 
3 Although the State's position on when the images of N.N.'s intimate areas were 
obtained by Mr. McLellan is not expressly set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the State 
does discuss the obtaining of these images in conjunction with the point in time where 
the video of her removing her clothing was initially made, and proceeds to argue error 
with regard to the district court's ruling, "[a]ssuming the images of [N.N.'s] body were 
'obtained' at the time she was video-taped naked." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9, 12.) The 
State has likewise not challenged, on appeal, the district court's factual finding that, "the 
evidence is clear that the Defendant obtained the images during his relationship with 
[N.N.] between 2004 and 2007." (R., p.69; see also Appellant's Brief, generally.) 
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charged by the State - it is not whether the magistrate believes that any offense has 
been committed. 
This is consistent with case law regarding the legal standards governing probable 
cause determinations at preliminary hearings. In order to establish probable cause, the 
State bears the burden to establish that a crime was committed and that there is 
probable cause to believe the defendant committed it. State v. Pole, 139 Idaho 370, 
372 (Ct. App. 2003). However, case law regarding whether probable cause has been 
established consistently roots the standards for this determination with regard to the 
"offense charged" by the State. Id.; see also State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57 (1983). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Stewart recently discussed the relationship 
between the probable cause determination rendered at a preliminary hearing and the 
criminal complaint upon which such determination must be made. See State v. Stewart, 
149 Idaho 383, 387-388 (2010). As explained by Stewart, it is the filing of the criminal 
complaint that commences a legal action. Id. at 387; see also I.C.R. 3. The effect of a 
waiver of a preliminary hearing is to "waive the right to a probable cause determination 
regarding the charged felony." Stewart, 149 Idaho at 387 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the function of a preliminary hearing is to require review by an independent 
magistrate to determine whether the State's particular allegation of criminal activity 
meets the evidentiary standard of probable cause. 
In this case, the State admittedly only charged Mr. McLellan with video 
voyeurism under the theory that he had obtained the video images of N.N.'s intimate 
areas with the intent to sexually abuse and degrade her, and that he had knowledge 
that the video was obtained with this intent. The evidence in this case shows that 
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Mr. McLellan obtained the images of N.N.'s intimate areas during the course of his prior 
dating relationship with N.N. The aspects of the video alleged to have been abusive or 
degrading towards N.N. were not present until well after this time. Mr. McLellan submits 
that the district court did not err when it determined that the State did not provide 
sufficient evidence with regard to the intent element as charged by the State, and, 
accordingly, the district court did not err in granting his motion to dismiss the State's 
Info rmation. 
2. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Establish Probable Cause For The 
Offense Of Video Voyeurism Under Any Of The Alternate Theories Of 
Liability Not Alleged By The State 
Mr. McLellan also asserts that, under any of the possible intents enumerated in 
I.C. § 18-6609(2), the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish probable 
cause as to his intent at the time the images of N.N.'s intimate areas were obtained. 
In this case, the State made a critical omission in the presentation of evidence in 
support of its charge - the State failed to present the actual video itself which was the 
subject of the State's video voyeurism allegation. While such an omission might not be 
automatically fatal for the State's claims with regard to establish the intent at the time 
the video was obtained, this omission coupled with the absence of any meaningful 
description of the context for the naked images of N.N., and the absence of any 
evidence at all of the surrounding circumstances regarding the taking of the video, left 
both the magistrate and the district court without any evidence upon which to base a 
finding of probable cause as to the intent of the person who took this video at the time it 
was made. 
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The sum total of the relevant information regarding the nature of this video as it 
related to the intent element is as follows.4 T.N. testified at the preliminary hearing that 
the video depicted N.N., "undressing for the camera," to the point where her breasts, 
vagina, and buttocks were displayed. (Prelim. Tr., p.?, L.25 - p.8, L.13.) T.N. also 
stated that "very strange noises" could be heard in the background, but did not 
elaborate as to what he meant by this description, and so the nature of these "strange" 
noises remained a mystery. (Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.2-6.) 
N.N. testified that the video underlying the State's charge depicted her naked, 
and showed what she would describe as intimate areas of her body, but did not provide 
any specifics as to the contents of this video and further could not recall whether her 
breasts were exposed on the video. (Prelim. Tr., p.14, L.11 - p.18, L.6.) Finally, 
Detective Lebar only testified that the video depicted a female undressing while 
occasionally looking at the camera, and that the video displayed her entire naked body.5 
(Prelim. Tr., p.27, L.2 - p.29, L.3.) 
4 While the State's witnesses testified as to text that was apparently overlaid onto the 
video images, such an overlay would be part of the editing process of the video 
subsequent to the images of nudity themselves being "obtained" by filming N.N. as she 
removed her clothing. (See Prelim. Tr., p.8, Ls.2-18.) Idaho Code § 18-6609(2)(b) 
requires that the images of the intimate areas be disseminated, published or sold "with 
the knowledge that such image or images were obtained with the intent set forth above." 
I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b). Thus, the statutorily required intent must exist at the time the 
images of intimate areas are initially obtained, not when the images may be 
subsequently modified or subjected to editing. Accordingly, Mr. McLellan's alleged 
"intent" at the time of allegedly editing this video after the fact is not relevant to this 
Court's review, as I.C. § 18-6609 is limited only to the defendant's intent at the time of 
initially obtaining the images as an element of the offense. See I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b). 
5 The State alleged in its objection to Mr. McLellan's motion to dismiss that the 
videotape at issue also showed N.N. masturbating. (R., p.60.) However, there is 
absolutely no evidence to substantiate this in the record. 
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Contrary to the State's assertion in this appeal, the mere fact that a video depicts 
an image of a woman - who is aware of the presence of the camera - removes her 
clothing while being filmed to the point where she is completely naked does not ipso 
facto establish any of the specific intents required under I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b). (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.8-12.) This reading would actually treat as a nullity or as mere 
surplusage the requirement that the images depicted be of the "intimate areas" of a 
person in addition to the images being obtained with a particular intent. See I.C. § 18-
6609(2)(b). The statute itself defines "intimate areas" as "the buttocks, genitals or 
genital areas of males or females, and the breast area of females." I.C. § 18-
6609(2)(a)(d). If it were enough to merely show that the person depicted in the images 
lacked clothing in order to establish the intent to gratify "some type of sexual appetite," 
which is the State's contention in this appeal, then the additional specific intent 
requirement in this statute is rendered mere surplusage. Accordingly, because a 
depiction of nudity is already required to sustain the element that the image or images 
be of an "intimate area," the additional intent element for video voyeurism necessarily 
requires evidence beyond mere proof that the images involved nudity. 
Mr. McLellan acknowledges that circumstantial evidence may, at times, be 
sufficient to demonstrate intent in absence of direct proof. See Reyes, 139 Idaho at 
506. However, in this case there was also no evidence regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the taking of this video that could have bridged the State's evidentiary gap. 
The sole person who testified at the preliminary hearing who was present when the film 
was allegedly taken or obtained by Mr. McLellan was N.N. And, by her own account, 
she had no memory of this video being taken at all. (Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.8-10.) 
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As has been noted, this Court interprets statutes so as to give effect to every 
word and phrase within the statute and to avoid treating any of the terms within the 
statute as mere surplusage. Bradbury, 149 Idaho at 116; Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177. 
The mere fact that a video was obtained that depicts a woman undressing to the point 
of nakedness does not, of itself, demonstrate that this image was initially obtained "with 
the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of 
such person or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious 
entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest, or for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or abusing another person." See I.C. § 18-6609(2). Nor can such proof 
establish knowledge of the fact of such intent at the time of obtaining such an image. 
See I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b). 
The State's argument to the contrary would render the language of I.C. § 18-
6609(2) that requires such an intent mere surplusage, since this intent is required in 
addition to proof that the defendant obtained an image or images of the intimate areas 
of a person. Because the State never presented the video underpinning the State's 
allegation of video voyeurism, presented no testimony as to the circumstances 
surrounding the making of this video, and only presented evidence that the video 
depicted a woman removing her clothes for the camera, Mr. McLellan submits that the 
district court correctly found insufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding as 
to the requisite intent for a charge of video voyeurism. Accordingly, Mr. McLellan asks 
that this Court affirm the district court's order granting his motion to dismiss the State's 
information in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. McLellan asks that this Court affirm the district court's order dismissing the State's 
information. 
DATED this 13th day of July, 2012. 
SjX AH E. TOM 
JDeputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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